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It’s done. Can it be stopped?
Can the law pull the plug on cybercrime?
Maybe. Maybe not.
ank robbers used to be famous: Bonnie and Clyde, Willie 
Sutton, John Dillinger. … They were fodder for headlines 
and the inspiration for movies.
Today, cybercriminals prefer to loot your bank ac-
count anonymously — on a scale undreamed of by the 
gun-toting gangsters of yesteryear.
Bank robbers and cybercriminals do have in com-
mon a love of technological improvements. In the 1930s, 
before the expansion of federal law enforcement, one 
could rob a bank in one state and simply drive into the 
next to elude arrest. Clyde Barrow wrote to Henry Ford 
thanking him for his automobiles that made eluding 
police so easy. 
Today — as students learn in the Cybersecurity and 
National Security Law class of Susan Brenner, Samuel A. 
McCray Chair in Law — cybercriminals continue to use 
technology to stay a step (or two) ahead of the law.
“Until this class,” Cristina Frankian ’14 said, “I didn’t 
realize what an issue cybersecurity is. I didn’t realize how 
complicated it is.”
That complexity — technological, geographical and 
legal — presents the legal system, corporations and pri-
vate citizens a problem that must be confronted, whether 
through changes in law, enhanced law enforcement or 
better defenses on the part of potential victims.
Cybercrime seems almost to have been born by acci-
dent. Early in the computer age, hacking was like a game. 
Brenner, in her 2010 book Cybercrime: Criminal Threats 
from Cyberspace, wrote of MIT in the 1970s when one’s 
computer might flash “Give me a cookie,” raising fears of 
lost work. But typing “cookie” would yield a thank you; 
and not doing anything, “I didn’t want a cookie anyway.”
No harm, no foul?
As computers became linked through larger net-
works and through the explosion of personal comput-
ers, hacking became more widespread. And hackers 
morphed into two groups: brilliant programmers and 
computer criminals. By the end of the 1990s, the prob-
lem was serious. On May 4, 2000, computers around  
the world received an email with the subject line 
ILOVEYOU and an attachment LOVE-LETTER-FOR-
YOU.TXT. Once it was opened, Brenner said, it  
emailed itself to everyone in that person’s address book. 
And the process repeated and repeated and repeated. 
The so-called Love Bug destroyed files as it infected 45 
million computers in at least 20 countries and caused  
$8 billion to 10 billion in damage.
The bug was traced to the Philippines, but no one 
was convicted of a crime. In 2000, the Philippines had no 
law against creating and spreading a computer virus.
Soon, the original creators of such malware were 
joined by others who had as their motive not just de-
struction but substantial profit. The malware business 
produces an estimated annual income of more than  
$100 billion. And it’s generally a legal business. Laws 
prohibit the use of malware but not its creation. Its use, 
however, is often not reported. For example, if one is 
running an online casino that could lose millions if its 
servers were shut down by an attack, one could see wis-
dom in paying $2,000 a month for “protection.”
Part of the difficulty in arresting and prosecuting 
perpetrators of cybercrime is analogous to those state 
boundaries that helped bank robbers of the past motor 
across state lines. Cybercrime is relatively new; quickly 
changing technology gives criminals new tools and op-
portunities. Law, however, changes slowly. And it is not 
a simple thing. The United States alone has 52 sets of 
laws (the states, the federal government, the District of 
Columbia).
And, Frankian said, “just look at the Homeland 
Security site, how many agencies are working on cyber-
security. That creates an overlap of work and a lack of 
communication. It’s inefficient.” 
And a hacker can be anywhere on earth. And Earth 
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has 193 countries. Maybe. The United 
Nations does have 193 members. The U.S. 
Department of State recognizes 195 nations. 
FIFA, the governing body of soccer, has 209 
national associations. Disagreements about 
sovereignty, jurisdiction and what consti-
tutes crime are commonplace — making 
prosecuting attacks on computers difficult.
Computers don’t make just good targets 
for crimes; they are also very useful tools 
themselves for committing traditional ones 
such as fraud, harassment and even murder. 
Some crimes would seem simple to avoid — 
don’t withdraw your savings when you get 
an email from Nigeria. But many people do. 
Victims in the United States have lost hun-
dreds of millions of dollars; the amount is 
estimated because most victims don’t report 
the crime to police.
Those wishing to stalk or harass others 
have found computers to be a powerful 
tool. And one that challenges legal descrip-
tions of certain crimes. For example, two 
sisters, ages 28 and 16,  were churchgoers 
in an Indiana town. Unknown to them, 
a man who worked at the church created 
Facebook pages in their names. He posted 
their photos, addresses, phone numbers and 
after-school activities. He used the pages to 
have virtual sex with men around the world. 
After two years, the church’s pastor — about 
to move on to a new post — was compil-
ing information for his successor about his 
congregation. 
After the confusion turned into a case, 
one of the sisters wrote to Brenner — who 
had blogged about it. The sisters were  
terrified.
The resolution of the case? Because the 
accused, Brenner said, “did not direct any of 
his activity toward either victim, he did not 
commit the crime of harassment.” Under 
a negotiated deal, he pled guilty to a lesser 
charge, was sentenced to 30 days and a year’s 
probation while receiving counseling. He 
had to surrender his computer.
Connecting the substantial damage 
caused by cybercrime to a perpetrator is 
often difficult if not impossible. Brenner 
considered the case of Aaron Caffrey, who 
lived in England with his parents. A chat 
room user made anti-American comments 
against Caffrey’s online American girlfriend. 
An attack was launched from Caffrey’s 
computer upon the computer of the person 
making the perceived insult.
The attack had a large incidental effect. 
Just nine days after the terrorist attacks of 
9/11, the computer system of the Port of 
Houston — a system essential for navigating 
ships in and out of the world’s eighth busiest 
harbor — was shut down by an external 
computer attack.
Caffrey did not contest that the at-
tack came from his computer. The defense 
claimed that, although his computer 
launched the attack, he did not. “Someone” 
must have installed malicious software that 
took over the computer without his knowl-
edge and then erased all traces of it. He was 
acquitted.
Often a crime committed across borders 
does not even come to trial. “A U.S. arrest 
warrant,” Brenner wrote, “is worthless in any 
other country, in the same way that a French 
warrant has no effect in the United States.”
There are, she noted, formal devices to 
obtain evidence from other countries, such 
as letters rogatory, treaty requests and re-
quests for assistance under executive agree-
ments. Letters rogatory, however, can take 
years. Requests under a mutual assistance 
treaty are faster but still can take months or 
longer. Assistance under executive agree-
ments, which do not have to be approved by 
Congress, have been used primarily to stem 
narcotics trafficking; they are unlikely to 
be used for attacking cybercrime. Informal 
cooperation is faster although dependent 
upon networks of individuals willing to aid 
each other.
Even if evidence is gathered, bring-
ing the accused to trial can be difficult. A 
country with an extradition treaty with 
another may be reluctant to give up one of 
its citizens to be prosecuted for a crime that 
may not be seen as serious when it occurs 
somewhere else. And a country without an 
extradition treaty has no legal obligation.
For an example of how complex a situ-
ation can be, Brenner pointed to the Rome 
Labs case. The Rome Air Force Develop-
ment Center at Griffiss Air Force Base in 
New York serves as, in the words of a Senate 
report, “the Air Force’s premier command 
and control research facility.” In the mid-
1990s, hackers installed programs on the 
labs’ networks and collected passwords, 
suggesting that they could access the labs’ 
databases. Four weeks of investigation fol-
lowed a cybertrail through South Africa, 
Mexico and European countries before find-
ing in London one of the two perpetrators: a 
16-year-old music student. Two more years 
of work led to the 21-year-old son of a police 
officer. The 16-year-old, prosecuted in Eng-
land, pled guilty to 12 counts of violating the 
Computer Misuse Act. Charges against the 
other were dropped.
A more recent case illustrates the dif-
ficulty when a cybercrime originates in a 
country with which the U.S. does not have 
an extradition treaty. Hackers broke into 
the systems of 40 U.S. companies, including 
banks, and tried to coerce the companies 
into hiring them as “security consultants.”
One company responded by hiring its 
Will Cristina Frankian ’14, who interned with a federal magistrate, have the tools when she 
goes into practice to take on cybercriminals?
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own cybercriminals to counterattack; the 
counterattack failed as it was deflected into 
an attack on the other companies. Another 
company refused to pay the $500,000 “con-
sulting fee.” Its website was knocked offline. 
The company went to the FBI, which sug-
gested drawing out negotiations with the 
hackers. One of the hackers, in an apparent 
attempt to land a job, sent his resume. That 
incautious act helped the FBI trace the 
source of the attack to Russia, with whom 
the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty.
Russia ignored requests that it detain 
the hacker. So, he and a partner were 
invited to come to the U.S. for a job inter-
view. They did and gladly demonstrated 
their hacking skills; this allowed the FBI to 
record their work, gaining access to their 
Russian server. They were arrested. The two 
argued their Fourth Amendment rights had 
been violated since the FBI did not have a 
search warrant. A federal judge, however, 
ruled the search took place in Russia, the 
site of the server, not in the U.S., so the 
Fourth Amendment did not apply. The two 
went to jail.
Russia requested that the FBI agent be 
surrendered for prosecution in Russia. Ac-
cording to Brenner, “the United States has 
apparently never responded.”
What other options did the FBI have? 
Kidnapping is a legal, though hardly 
practical, option, Brenner noted. An 1886 
Supreme Court ruling, recently upheld, 
said “the power of a court to try a person 
for crime is not impaired by the fact that he 
had been brought within the court’s juris-
diction by reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’”
Law enforcement has serious problems 
in its attempts to counter cybercrime. Law 
and law enforcement evolve. Technology 
changes faster.
For millennia before the creation of 
the Metropolitan Police in 19th-century 
London and its descendants worldwide, po-
licing was the work of either the military or 
of amateurs. In England over the centuries, 
a “hue and cry” aroused the citizenry to 
pursue a criminal. Over time experiments 
were made with private police forces until 
in 1829 Sir Robert Peel created the London 
Metropolitan Police. That model remains 
today.
But it was created with assumptions 
that fall apart in cyber reality. It assumes 
real-world crime, which Brenner pointed 
out, by being committed in a tangible 
physical environment, has four character-
istics: proximity, scale, physical constraints, 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated …
Then, one might ask, “Why does it seem 
like everybody on earth can read my email?”
The Fourth Amendment may be the 
same as it was in the 18th century, but the 
world is different. So what is the state now of 
the right of Americans against unreasonable 
search and seizure?
Susan Brenner, in her book, Cybercrime: 
Criminal Threats from Cyberspace, sum-
marized the history of the application of the 
Fourth Amendment and looked at issues 
presented by cyber-reality.
Until the 15th century in England, gov-
ernment searches of private property were, 
Brenner wrote, almost unknown. In the late 
15th century, some guilds were authorized to 
search private property to enforce their regu-
lations. A century later, the Court of the Star 
Chamber gained the authority to search and 
to seize books unlawfully printed. Heretics 
and political dissenters as well as printers 
became targets.
In the 18th century, courts became more 
likely to side with the citizens, and an English-
man’s home did become more like a castle. 
That an exception seemed to be made for 
citizens residing in the American colonies was 
a cause of both revolution and the adop-
tion of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. For a century, American courts 
had little trouble in applying the amendment; 
it obviously applied to searches of people 
and places.
In 1876, Congress passed a law to protect 
people from being defrauded by crooked lot-
teries using the U.S. mail. A citizen challenged 
the constitutionality of the law. He lost, but 
the Supreme Court did hold that sealed mail 
(as distinct from items such as newspapers) 
was fully guarded from inspection “as if they 
were retained by the parties forwarding them 
in their own domiciles.”
Also in 1876, Alexander Graham Bell 
invented the telephone. Soon police began 
tapping phones; this was seen — since 
calls went through an operator — as akin to 
reading someone’s postcard, not opening a 
sealed letter. By the 1920s, however, opera-
tors were replaced by automated systems. 
Roy Olmstead, a convicted bootlegger, ap-
pealed because wiretap evidence was used 
to convict him. A Supreme Court majority 
upheld the conviction; the man’s home had 
not been entered.
Justice Louis Brandeis dissented. “He 
was able to grasp,” Brenner wrote, “the 
significance of the new technology.”
Brandeis wrote: “The progress of science 
in furnishing the government with means of 
espionage is not likely to stop with wiretap-
ping. Ways may … be developed by which 
the government, without removing papers 
from secret drawers, can reproduce them 
in court, and by which it will be enabled to 
expose … the most intimated occurrences of 
the home. … That places the liberty of every 
man in the hands of every petty officer.”
In 1965 the Supreme Court overturned 
the Olmstead decision. A 1979 decision, 
however, ruled that the government could 
use devices to record phone numbers a per-
son calls and numbers from which calls come 
to that person. Justice Thurgood Marshall 
dissented, as does professor Brenner.
Then came email.
It’s not like a letter. Unless one encrypts 
email (and, Brenner notes, few do outside 
of the military and intelligence communi-
ties), email is treated as a postcard. Since 
the same technology that scans for spam 
and obscenity can scan for other content, 
the government, employers and others can 
have easy access to the content of email. 
The government would need a court order 
or subpoena. Employers can generally just 
rely on employees to click “I agree” on email 
policies. And the material in the “to” and 
“from” fields and the data generated as the 
email is transmitted have no Fourth Amend-
ment protection whatsoever.
The Internet is not one’s physical castle. 
And its legal bulwarks are an evolving field.
Privacy, anyone?
and patterns. It’s hard to physically attack 
or physically rob somebody who is half-
way around the world. Real-world crime is 
often on an old-fashioned one-to-one basis. 
Real-world crime occurs in a specific place; 
the criminal has to be familiar with it, often 
has to be there. And much real-world crime 
is tracked because criminals repeat actions; 
they have patterns.
Cybercrime is automated. “Perpetra-
tors,” Brenner wrote, “can commit thou-
sands of crimes quickly and with little ef-
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“Companies work 
with others,” she said, 
“essentially cyber-
mercenaries who could 
counterattack. But an 
‘eye-for-an-eye’ could 
become cyberwar.”
That’s partly because 
finding the target can 
be difficult. The hacker 
in the Rome Labs 
case, Brenner pointed 
out, “routed his attack 
through a North Korean 
nuclear facility. Hacking 
back would have attacked 
that.”
Frankian, in her 
research this past term, 
looked at an alternative 
to counterattack: empow-
ering the government to 
help companies establish 
a good defense. She 
envisions the possibility 
of an overarching federal 
agency not only to regu-
late, she said, but also “to 
reach out to businesses, 
financial institutions and 
utilities to see where they 
are vulnerable, to see 
what they need in case of 
cyberattack.”
Such an approach 
may not be as grand a 
plan as rewriting laws in some 200 nations 
or hiring bands of mercenary hackers, but 
as Brenner wrote, “Encouraging cybercrime 
prevention is not a particularly exciting 
strategy, but it would probably make cyber-
criminals’ lives more difficult [and] it could 
increase the effectiveness of law enforce-
ment efforts.”
For further reading
Students set up a fake social media account in the name of their assistant principal. They use 
the account to invite children to communicate with, the children think, the assistant principal. The 
children are then bombarded with porn.
The assistant principal sues in federal court.
He loses.
After all, the judge noted, even Facebook admitted that nearly 10 percent of its users were “du-
plicates, false or undesirable.”
The assistant principal “can presumably try suing in state court,” Susan Brenner wrote in her blog 
CYB3RCRIM3 (cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com), where she has analyzed that case and hundreds of others in 
detail.
Brenner, Samuel A. McCray Chair in Law, has also published several books and journal articles on 
cybercrime (see www.udayton.edu/directory/law/brenner_susan.php).
fort.” And with little regard 
to boundaries.
With law enforcement 
response to cybercrime, 
Frankian said, “there is no 
time for strategy or analy-
sis. An attack can come 
from anywhere. And you 
don’t see it coming.”
At the same time, 
“cybercrime has not 
altered people’s inclina-
tion,” Brenner wrote, “to 
rape, rob or kill in the 
real world.” Added to 
the increased quantity of 
crimes are enforcement 
difficulties peculiar to 
cybercrime. The police 
often aren’t involved 
until well after the crime 
is committed and the trail 
has become cold. Evidence 
is fragile and volatile. And 
the hesitancy to report cy-
bercrime makes establish-
ing patterns different.
What can be done?
Brenner noted that 
efforts have been made 
by several organizations. 
International studies of 
cybercrime have been 
done since the 1980s. The 
Council of Europe drafted 
a cybercrime treaty to 
harmonize national laws. The United Na-
tions passed a resolution. The G8 and other 
groups of nations have called for consistent 
laws.
But because of nations’ concerns for 
their sovereignty, it is unlikely they will 
cede power to a central policing agency. 
INTERPOL, for example, has a cybercrime 
initiative but focuses on supporting law 
enforcement at the national level.
A treaty, the Convention on Cyber-
crime, was in 2001 presented to countries 
for ratification. By the time of Brenner’s 
2010 book, it had been signed by 46 coun-
tries and ratified by 20, the United States 
and 19 European countries. Russia refused 
to sign it. And many countries aren’t just 
passively opposed; some operate like the 
island havens for sea-going pirates of the 
1600s. Having your nation’s banking opera-
tions secret may not be something pleas-
ing to other nations — but it can be very 
profitable.
Awaiting attack
“This is a very compla-
cent country,” Susan Brenner 
said. “Europe is not. They’ve 
been attacked, invaded and 
bombed by neighbors. We’ve 
gotten used to being bordered 
by Mexico and Canada.”
And having a big ocean 
on each side and the world’s 
most powerful air force 
overhead can also bolster our 
 Some solutions offered to combat cy-
bercrime do not focus on the law. Frankian 
this year did research on cyberdefense. The 
option of offensive measures (“hacking 
back”), though illegal, has recently gained 
momentum and is supported by U.S. 
companies who have been the victims of 
destructive and costly cyberattacks.
feeling of security.
Brenner does not worry, however, about the country being physi-
cally invaded but about its citizens being the victims of cyberattacks 
launched by criminals, often from the security of havens in rogue states.
“It’s amazing how vulnerable we are,” said Aaron Wiener ’14 (pic-
tured above), a student this past fall in Susan Brenner’s Cybersecurity 
and National Security Law class. “Security is expensive, and the threat is 
not perceived.”
Even before entering UDSL, however, Wiener began trying to spread 
awareness of the threat and do something to improve defenses against it.
“Accountants often send unsecured email and faxes,” he said, “an 
identity thief ’s dream come true.”
Wiener, who was a communication major at the University of Illi-
nois, joined forces with friends who were knowledgeable about account-
ing to found DocPalApp.com, an application that provides accountants 
a secure way to transmit documents. He hopes that the app having been 
developed specifically for accountants will give it a market edge over 
more generic devices.
Whatever method accountants or other business people choose, “we 
have to say to citizens,” Brenner said, “protect yourselves. And a lot of 
businesses are coming to realize this.”
